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ABSTRACT 
This study explores whether board political connection is important to firms performance in Nigeria which has a 
growing financial market. The study also provides a descriptive analysis of firms whose board members are 
politically connected in the context of Nigeria, with a special focus on their corporate governance features. A 
total of thirty listed firms in the Nigerian Stock Exchange were used. Secondary sources of data were used. The 
research data were analyzed based on regression analysis using ordinary least square method and correlation 
analysis .The empirical findings revealed that there is no significant positive relationship between board 
composition, board political connection and firm performance. There is a negative relationship between board 
size and firm performance. Therefore, managers should lay appropriate policy in order to maximize firm 
performance as well as organizing the firm’s resources. 
Keywords: Firm Performance, Political connection, Board Size, Board Composition. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
When it comes to competition; nothing differentiates better than result. All a firm’s marketing campaign, 
strategic planning and efficient activities will not compensate for a lack of result. Results are what one can point 
to, results are measurable, and results silence every doubt in the customer’s mind (Philips, 2011). It is due to the 
importance of result to firms, the board of directors is constituted. Board member possess power and influence 
over firms strategy, policy and decision making authority, and therefore a potentially significant event in any 
firm is a change in the composition of the board, either with the appointment of a new member of the board who 
is equipped with what the firm needs to produce significant result or an existing member ceasing to remain on 
the board. The degree of board effectiveness and independence is also closely related to its composition (John 
and Senbet, 1998; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988) 
The performance of any firm cannot be overemphasized and taken for granted in a country like Nigeria 
that is dominated by politics. Politics plays an important role in any business environment. Therefore, for a firm 
to have significant impact in the business environment, we must consider the very scenarios where board 
political connections are of essence. The performance of a firm in a country is dependent various factors. One of 
the major factors that determine the growth and performance of a firm is its board composition and connections. 
These connections can either be economical, social, political, financial, e.t.c. which goes a long way in affecting 
the firm’s value, profitability, market share e.t.c. This study considers that board political connection affects the 
performance of firms in Nigeria. This is because the composition and connections of the board of directors of a 
firm to a large extent determines the survival of the firm in the market place. Therefore, the firm must do all it 
can to get the right calibre of individuals on its board so that it can be a force to be reckoned with in the market. 
The world of business today is filled with so many uncertainties and unpredictable situations. And it’s 
as result of these complexities in the business environment, those in charge of firms to look for those elements 
that affect their firms’ performance. This they do by surveying markets, gathering information and establishing 
necessary connections that will make them achieve their goals and objectives in the business environment. This 
study seeks to answer the following question. 
i. Does board composition affect firm performance? 
ii. Can board political connection affect firm performance? 
iii. Will board size affect the performance of the firm? 
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REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
INTRODUCTION 
 A board of director is a body of elected or appointed members who jointly oversee the activities of a 
company or organization. Other names include board of governors, board of managers, board of regents, board 
of trustee and board of visitors. It is often simply referred to as board. 
 In some European Union and Asian countries, there are two types of separate boards, an executive 
board, also called corporate executive form, for day to day business and a supervisory board, also called board of 
director (elected by shareholders) for supervising the executive board. A board’s activities are determined by the 
powers, duties and responsibilities delegated to it and conferred on it by an authority outside itself. These matters 
are typically detailed in the organization’s bylaws. The bylaws commonly also specify the number of members 
of the board, how they can be chosen and when they are to meet. The roles of the board of directors are as 
follows: 
i) The business of a firm is managed under the direction of the board of director, who delegate to the CEO 
and other management staff, the day today management of the affairs of the firm. 
ii) The board sees to the appointment of a qualified person as the CEO and other management staff. 
iii) The directors, with their wealth of experience, provide leadership and direct the affair of the business 
with the committees of the firm, its business plans and long-term shareholders. 
iv) The board provides other oversight functions. 
v) Setting their own salary and compensation 
vi) Accounting by the stakeholder for the organization performance. The legal responsibilities of the board 
and the board members vary with the nature of the organization, and the jurisdiction within which it 
operates. For public corporations, these responsibilities are typically much more rigorous and complex 
than those of other types. 
Typically the board chooses one of its members to be the chairman who holds whatever title is specified 
in the by law. The directors of the organizations are the persons who are member of the board. Several specific 
firms categorize directors by the preserves and absence of their other relationship to the organization. Insider 
director: An insider director is a director who is also an employee, officer, major shareholder, or someone 
similarly connected to the organization. Insider director represent the interest of the entity’s stakeholders, and 
often have special knowledge of the its inner workings, its financial or market position and so on. An insider 
director who is employed as a manager, Executive of the organization is sometimes referred to as executive 
director (not to be confused with executive director sometimes used for C.E.O. position). Executive directors 
often have a specified area of responsibility in the organization such as finance, marketing, human resources or 
production.  
A. Outside director: An outside director is the member of the board who is not otherwise employed by or 
engaged with the organization and does not represent any of the stakeholders. A typical example is a 
director who is president of a form in a different industry. 
Outside directors bring outside experience and perspective to the board. They keep a watchful eye on 
the way the organization is run. Outside directors are often useful in handling dispute between inside directors or 
between shareholders and the board. They are thought to be advantageous because they can be objective and 
present little risk of conflict of interest. On the other hand, they might lack familiarity with the specific issues 
connecting to the organization’s governance. (en.m.wilkipedia.org/wiki/board-of-directors) 
The concept “Corporate governance” has attracts various definitions. Metrick and Ishii (2002) define 
corporate governance from the perspective of the investor as “both the promise to repay a fair return on capital 
invested and committed to operate a firm, efficiently given investment”. The implication of the definition is that 
corporate governance has an impact on the firm’s ability to access the capital market. Metrick and Ishii argue 
that firm level governance may be more important in the developing markets with weaker institutions as it helps 
to distinguish among firms. Cadbury Committee (1992) defined corporate governance as “the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled”. Zingale (1998) also defines a governance system as “the complex set of 
constraints that shape the ex-port bargaining over the quasi rent registered by the firm” .According to Mayer 
(1997), corporate governance is concern with way of bargaining the interests of (investors and managers) into 
line ensuring that firms are run for the benefit of the investors. Corporate governance in concerned with the 
relationship between the internal governance mechanisms of corporations and society’s conception of the scope 
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of corporate accountability (Deakin and Hughes, 1997). It has been defined by (Keasey et al 1997) to include the 
structure, processes, cultures and systems that engender the successful operation of organization. Corporate 
governance is also seen as the whole set of measure taken within the social entity that is an enterprise to favour 
the economic agent to take part in the productive process, in other to generate some organizational surplus, and 
to set up a fair distribution between the partners, taking into consideration what they have brought to the 
organization (Maati, 1999). 
In the light of the foregoing analysis, it may be stated generally that different system of corporate 
governance will embody what are considered to the legitimate lines of accountability by defining the nature of 
the relationship between the company and key corporate constituencies. Thus, corporate governance system may 
be thought of as mechanism for establishing the nature of ownership and control of organizations within an 
economy. In this context, ‘corporate governance mechanisms are economic and legal institutions that can be 
altered through political process- sometimes for the better’ (shleifer and vishny, 1997). Company law, along with 
the forms of regulation (including stock exchange listing rules, and accounting standard), both shape and is 
shaped by prevailing systems of corporate governance occurs through its effects on the way which the 
companies are owned, the form in which they are controlled and the process by which changes in ownership and 
control take place (Jenkinson and Mayer, 1992). Ownership is established by company law, which defines 
property rights and income streams of those with interests in or against the business enterprise (Deakin and 
slinger, 1997). Corporate governance describes how companies ought to be run, directed and controlled 
(Cadbury committee, 1992). It is about supervising and holding to account those direct and control the 
management. 
Composition of the board with relation to the members of inside and outside director determines board 
independence and effectiveness (John and Senbet, 1998). Increase or decrease in the member of outside directors 
is expected to make impact on shareholders’ wealth and the discipline of Chief Executive Officers (C.E.Os.), 
with an increase in the proportion of outside directors conveying a positive signal of board independence and 
efficiency and a decrease conveying a contrary signal. Hermalin and Weishach (1991) attempt to analyze 
differences in firm performance caused by board composition and ownership structure in order to measure the 
direct incentive and monitoring faced by top management. They view the board as one of the alternative control 
devices that limit agency problem between top management and shareholders. Their main conclusion is that 
there is a relationship between composition and performance, while there is a strong relationship between 
ownership structure and performance. Offering a couple of explanations for their puzzling finding on the 
relationship between board composition and performance, the authors argue that inside and outside directors 
have their respective advantages and disadvantages. If each board is optimally weighted between the insiders and 
outsiders, there would be on cross sectional relation between board composition and performance in equilibrium. 
 To study the decision making, board size and firm performance, prior studies on group decision making 
suggests that large groups have to make compromises before reaching a consensus and, therefore, they are likely 
to make more moderate decision (Kogan and Wallach 1991; Moscovic and Zavalconic, 1969). Sah and Stiglitz 
(1991) discuss the implication of group-decision making process, Cleng(2008) finds that larger boards reduce 
variability in firm performance. On the other hand, Adams, Almeida and Ferriera(2008) find that firms in which 
board decisions are influenced by the presence of a powerful CEO exhibit high stock-return volatility, thus 
suggesting a greater risk due to decisions made by an individual. In a contingent claims frame work, covering 
firm risk would lower the equity holder value and increase debt holder value and vice versa (Black and Scholes, 
1973). Furthermore, this shift in value should be a function of the amount of coverage in a firm’s capital 
(Parrino, Poteshman and Weishash, 2005). By covering risk, a large board would shift wealth from equity holder 
to debt holder.  There is a view that larger boards are better for corporate performance because they have a 
range of expertise to help make better decision, and are harder for a powerful CEO to dominate. However, recent 
thinking has leaned towards smaller board, Jensen (1993) and Lipton &lorch (1992) argue that large board’s gets 
to big, it becomes difficult to co-ordinate and process problems. Smaller boards also reduce the possibility of 
free riding by individual directors and increase their decision making process. Empirical research supports this. 
For example, Yermack (1996) documents that for large U.S. industrial corporations, the market value of firms 
with small boards more highly. Eisenberg et al (1998) also find negative correlation between board size and 
profitability when using sample of small and mid size finish firms. Yermark’s (1996) seminar paper presented 
evidence of a negative effect of board size on performance, a result which has been subsequently confirmed by 
many scholars. However, Coles et al (2008) found a U-shape relationship between board size and performance 
following their interpretation, complex firm requires a number of directors and of outsiders as compared to 
simple firms, while R&D intensive firm should better make intensive use of insider directors. However, by 
looking at the particular role covered by director in committees (i.e. finance committee, investment committee), 
a positive relationship between insider director who were members of the committees and performance emerged.  
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        The importance of political connection to a firm is manifested in several ways for instances, Baum et el 
(2008) are of the view that the support of parliamentarians is extremely important for firms’ minimization of 
transaction cost associated with government bureaucracy. In addition, parliamentarians often set the rules of the 
game e.g entry barriers and statutory capital requirement. Furthermore, the legislative powers enhance firms’ 
profitability of winning tenders for participation in privatization process or for handling the transaction of state 
institutions. All these play out to enhance the profitability of the political affiliated firm. It is not well recognized 
that politically-connected enterprises behave differently from those lacking such links. For instance research has 
documented that politically-connected firms have higher leverage ratios than their non-connected peer (Johnson, 
2003; Cull and Xu, 2005; and Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Furthermore, authors like (Roberts, 1990; fisman, 2001; 
and Faccio, 2006) have shown that a large proportion of the value of connected firms could be explained by the 
presence of their political associations. Faccio and parsley (2006) introduce a different approach in tracing for 
the political connections. They argue that political connection is based on the geographic origin and education 
and therefore suggest that politician systematically favour local firms and so location forms a basis of political 
connections. Faccio (2006) studies corporate political connections around the globe; she suggests that 
connections are particularly common in countries that are perceived as being highly corrupt: the connections are 
less common in the presence of the more stringent regulation of political conflict of interest. Niessen and Ruenzi 
(2009) worked in a sample of 605 German public companies observed in 2006, and find that politically 
connected firm are providing better accounting as well as stock market performance results. Bertrand et al 
(2004), by using a unique dataset of corporation listed on the Paris stock exchange over the 1992-2003 period 
found that firm run by politically-connected CEOs were not over performing industries but they were slightly 
profitable than firms run by CEOs with pure private sector background. The interpretation that politically-
connected CEOs were distorting the labour demand of their firms to favour incumbents in upcoming political 
election by creating more jobs or by destroying fewers plants in politically contested areas, by hiring more (or 
firing less) workers. Firm had better access to subsidies and were allowed to pay lower local taxes, but the costs 
of this management style was out weighing its benefits and the net effects on performance turned out to be 
negative. Sometime businesses compete not only in business but also vie for political power. A politically-
connected enterprise can be seen as one that currently has at least one legally or publicly associated 
representative in government who was once a member of the board, worked within it management cadre, or 
served on the board of a business group to which he belongs. A company can also be considered as politically 
connected if its large shareholder or top manager includes a member of parliament, minister or head of state, or if 
managers are closely related to any of the top official (Baum et al., 2008). Since politics gives access to the 
economy and possibility to be set the rule of the game, a strong political relationship could be considered as one 
of the most important intangible assets of any firm.  
 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The study population with regard to this work will cover all firms quoted on the stock exchange of 
Nigeria. In many cases study of the whole population proves difficult due to constraints that researchers have no 
power over to control. Hence, a sample of the population is then taken for study in place of the entire population. 
For the purpose of this study sample consist of thirty quoted firms in the Nigerian stock exchange is employed 
through simple sampling technique. The sources of data use in the study will be obtained mainly from secondary 
sources. The secondary source of data will be obtained from 2009 financial statements of the thirty companies. 
The method of data analysis used on this study is the regression analysis. The ordinary least square regression 
technique would be adopted in this study due to its cherished properties of unbiasedness and consistency. 
                     MODEL SPECIFIATION 
     The model in its econometric form is presented below: 
     Firm P= 0 + 1BCOM + 2PCON + 3SIZE +e 
Where P stands for performance 
BCOM= Board composition 
BPCON= Board political connection 
BSIZE= Board size (Number of directors on the board) 
E= error term 
 There several ways of measuring firm performance and there is hardly any agreement on which is the 
most efficient one. The dependent variable is firm performance. One of the financial qualities commonly used in 
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the literature to measure firm performance is earnings per share (EPS). EPS represent the earnings for the fiscal 
year for the listed companies. Earnings refer to profit after tax, minority interest and preferred dividend. The 
higher the EPS the better the firm’s performance. 
   Due to the small sample size,the t-value obtained from the regression result would be used in testing 
the hypothesis of the study. 
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
This deals with the presentation and analysis of the empirical results obtained from the estimation 
exercise. The study has attempted to empirically examine the impact of board political connection on firm 
performance. The variables used in the model include as earnings per share (EPS) as the dependent variable 
while the independent variables include board composition (BCOM), board political connection (BPCON), and 
Board size (BS). The model was estimated using the ordinary least square (OLS) estimation technique with the 
aid of computer software (Eviews7). The hypotheses stated was tested using the t-ratios obtained from the 
regression result. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
  BCOM BPCON BS EXEC NEXEC EPS 
 Mean 0.607529 0.7 11.43333 4.566667 6.866667 32.04333 
 Median 0.6 1 11 4 7 10 
 Maximum 0.909091 1 20 11 11 918 
 Minimum 0.2 0 5 1 1 -1036 
 Std. Dev. 0.166475 0.466092 4.031628 2.64814 2.63574 281.9513 
Skewness -0.150824 -0.872872 0.204333 0.649336 -0.071525 -0.581501 
 Kurtosis 2.862496 1.761905 2.197493 2.793244 2.415876 11.28753 
              
Jarque-Bera 0.137373 5.725624 1.013781 2.161619 0.45208 87.54469 
 Probability 0.933619 0.057108 0.602366 0.339321 0.797686 0.00000 
 Observations 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Source:  E-Views Output (2011) 
The table above shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used. The minimum board composition 
of non-executive to the size of the board is about 20% while the maximum board composition of non-executive 
to the size of the board is about 90%. On average board composition of non-executive to the size of the board is 
about 61%. The minimum board size (BS) is about 5 members while the maximum board size (BS) is about 20 
members. On average the board size (BS) is about 11 members. The minimum executive member on the board 
(EXEC) is about 1 member while the maximum executive member on the board (EXEC) is about 11 members. 
On average the executive members on the board (EXEC) is about 5 members. The minimum non-executive 
member on the board (EXEC) is about 1 member while the maximum non-executive member on the board 
(EXEC) is about 11 members. On average the non-executive members on the board (EXEC) is about 7 members. 
The minimum earnings per share (EPS) is about –1036kobo while the maximum earnings per share (EPS) is 
about 918 kobo. On average the earnings per share (EPS) is about 32kobo. The Jarque Bera statistics shows that 
most of the variables used in the study are normally distributed. 
The result from the correlation analysis is presented below: 
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Table 4.2:  Correlation Matrix 
  BCOM BPCON BS EXEC NEXEC EPS 
BCOM 1 -0.16742 -0.12241 -0.68862 0.504625 0.141811 
BPCON -0.16742 1 0.346826 0.365983 0.162801 0.126839 
BS -0.12241 0.346826 1 0.764287 0.761717 -0.0668 
EXEC -0.68862 0.365983 0.764287 1 0.164349 -0.11805 
NEXEC 0.504625 0.162801 0.761717 0.164349 1 0.016427 
EPS 0.141811 0.126839 -0.0668 -0.11805 0.016427 1 
Source:  E-Views Output (2011) 
The table shows that the co-efficient of correlation of a variable with respect to itself is 1.000. This 
indicates that there exists a perfect Correlation between a variable with respect to itself. The correlation co-
efficient between the dependent variable and independent variables are discussed below:  
i. There exists a positive relationship between EPS and BCOM with a value of 0.14 which means the 
strength of relationship between them is about 14% which shows a weak positive relationship between 
board composition and firm performance. An increase in board composition in terms of more 
independent directors would lead to an increase in firm performance. 
ii. There exists a positive relationship between EPS and BPCON with a value of 0.12 which means the 
strength of relationship between them is about 12% which shows a weak positive relationship between 
board political connection and firm performance. The more politically connected the board is the better 
the performance of the firm. 
iii. There exists a negative relationship between EPS and BS with a value of -0.06 which means the 
strength of relationship between them is about 6% which shows a weak negative relationship between 
board size and firm performance. A increase in board size would lead to a decrease in firm 
performance. 
iv. There exists a negative relationship between EPS and EXEC with a value of -0.11 which means the 
strength of relationship between them is about 11% which shows a weak negative relationship between 
executive directors on the board and firm performance. An increase in number of executive directors on 
the board would lead to a decrease in firm performance. 
v. There exists a positive relationship between EPS and EXEC with a value of 0.02 which means the 
strength of relationship between them is about 2% which shows a very weak positive relationship 
between non-executive directors on the board and firm performance. An increase in number of non-
executive directors on the board would lead to an increase in firm performance. 
       The result from the Ordinary Least Square Regression analysis is presented below: 
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Table 4.3: Ordinary Least Square Regression Result 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -123.2906 276.4233 -0.446021 0.6593 
BCOM 271.3018 328.3320 0.826303 0.4162 
BPCON 116.9167 124.0918 0.942179 0.3548 
BS -7.988181 14.25078 -0.560543 0.5799 
R-squared 0.154861     Mean dependent var 32.04333 
Adjusted R-squared 0.114193     S.D. dependent var 281.9513 
S.E. of regression 289.4905     Akaike info criterion 14.29769 
Sum squared resid 2178923.     Schwarz criterion 14.48451 
Log likelihood -210.4653     F-statistic 0.503061 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.145904     Prob(F-statistic) 0.683508 
Source:  E-Views Output (2011) 
The coefficient of determination (R-Square) with a value of 0.15 means that about 15% of the total 
systematic variations in the firm performance on the Nigerian Stock Exchange have been explained by the 
explanatory variables namely  composition(BCOM), board political connection (BPCON), Board size (BS). The 
Adjusted R-square shows that after adjusting for the degree of freedom the model could still explain only about 
11% of the total systematic variations in the firm performance on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, while about 89% 
of the systematic variation in the firm performance on the Nigerian Stock Exchange was left unaccounted for by 
the model which has been captured by the stochastic disturbance term in the model. This indicates a poor fit of 
the regression line which means that other factor that could explain variations of the firm performance on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange other than corporate governance mechanisms and political connections of the firm, 
which was not included in the model.  
On the basis of the overall statistical significance of the model as indicated by the F-statistics, it was 
observed that the overall model was statistically significant since the calculated F- value of 0.50 was less than 
the critical F-value of 5.2 at 5% level of significance. This shows that there exist no significant linear 
relationship between in the firm performance on the Nigerian Stock Exchange and all the explanatory variables 
taken together. On the basis of the individual statistical significance, as shown by the t-ratios in the table above, 
it was observed that none of the variables were statistically significant at 5% and 10% level of significance. This 
means board composition(BCOM), board political connection (BPCON), Board size (BS) do not have a 
significant influence on the firm performance on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
In order to improve on the ordinary least square regression result a higher order estimating technique 
was adopted using the Cochrane orcutt Iterative techniques. The result is presented below: 
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Table 4.4:  Cochrane Orcutt Convergence achieved after 9 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -67.64559 294.6146 -0.229607 0.8203 
BCOM 264.9837 335.5354 0.789734 0.4374 
BPCON 118.3992 132.5929 0.892953 0.3807 
BS -12.40957 15.94769 -0.778142 0.4441 
AR(1) -0.109115 0.218943 -0.498372 0.6228 
R-squared 0.263836     Mean dependent var 32.70310 
Adjusted R-squared 0.242191     S.D. dependent var 286.9184 
S.E. of regression 299.8525     Akaike info criterion 14.40004 
Sum squared resid 2157877.     Schwarz criterion 14.63578 
Log likelihood -203.8006     F-statistic 0.409136 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.016085     Prob(F-statistic) 0.800241 
Inverted AR Roots       -.11 
Source:  E-Views Output (2011) 
It was observed that the value of the R-square improved from 0.15 to 0.26. The coefficient of 
determination (R-Square) with a value of 0.26 means that about 26% of the total systematic variations in the firm 
performance on the Nigerian Stock Exchange have been explained by the explanatory variables namely  
composition(BCOM), board political connection (BPCON), Board size (BS). The Adjusted R-square shows that 
after adjusting for the degree of freedom the model could still explain only about 24% of the total systematic 
variations in the firm performance on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, while about 76% of the systematic variation 
in the firm performance on the Nigerian Stock Exchange was left unaccounted for by the model which has been 
captured by the stochastic disturbance term in the model. This indicates a poor fit of the regression line which 
means that other factor that could explain variations of the firm performance on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
other than corporate governance mechanisms and political connections of the firm, which was not included in the 
model. On the basis of the overall statistical significance of the model as indicated by the F-statistics, it was 
observed that the overall model was statistically significant since the calculated F- value of 0.40 was less than 
the critical F-value of 5.2 at 5% level of significance. This shows that there exist no significant linear 
relationship between in the firm performance on the Nigerian Stock Exchange and all the explanatory variables 
taken together. The Durbin Watson statistic with a value of 2.0 indicates the absence of first order 
autocorrelation in the model. 
On the basis of the individual statistical significance, as shown by the t-ratios in the table above, it was 
observed that none of the variables were statistically significant at 5% and 10% level of significance. This means 
board composition (BCOM), board political connection (BPCON), Board size (BS) do not have a significant 
influence on the firm performance on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The result showed that there exist a direct 
relationship board composition (BCOM), board political connection (BPCON), and Board size (BS) with firm 
performance. Only Board Size (BS) showed an inverse relationship with firm performance. 
  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
 The consequences of involving or allowing politics and business in Nigeria have been explored in this 
study through direct measure of political connection of board members. Previous researchers on political 
connection have found Nigerian firms to have benefited one way or the other from members of the board of 
directors who are politically connected. The result of this study is consistent with view of some authors that 
corporate connections with political officials have no effect on the performance of a firm. Among all the firms 
studied there is clear indication that board size and board composition have no impact on firm performance. It is 
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a known and established fact that the main purpose of every business organization is to make profit. Profit to 
large extent determines the survival of a firm in a business environment. It also determines how seriously the 
firm would be taken by investors. It is as a result of these factors, firms look out for ways to enhance their 
performance in other to remain in business. One of the ways whereby firms seek to enhance performance is by 
searching for credible and experienced individuals who are aware of the happenings in the business environment 
to occupy important position and also to make critical decisions that will affect the future of the firm.  
This study has been able to prove that politics is a reality today which should not be neglected. It also 
considers the weakness and strength of political connections to a firm analyzed by different authors. Therefore, 
the conclusion of this study is as follows:  
i. There is no significant positive relationship between board composition and firm performance.  
ii. There is no significant positive relationship between board political connection and firm performance. 
iii. There is a negative relationship between board size and firm performance. 
 This study provides some evidence where regulators can implement certain rules in order to increase 
good corporate governance. The problem doing business in a country with weak law enforcement and  low 
transparency is that business leaders are encourage to seek political connection as a way to enhance their 
business. In order to increase the level of corporate governance, regulators or independent agencies should be set 
up on how politicians should get involved in any both directly or indirectly. 
 There should be the corporate governance benchmark and promotion given out to firms who scores 
highest and penalty for firms who scores below the benchmark. This can serve as one of the investors’ criteria. 
This study provides some insight on firm’s business and political power. When making an investment decision, 
investor needs to consider both firm business strategy and how firm operates according to the good corporate 
governance policy. Managers should lay appropriate policy in order to maximize firm performance as well as 
organizing the firm’s resources. As a good corporate governance policy, board of directors must consist of 
independent directors from outside to monitor and provide necessary guidance.  
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APPENDIX 
 BCOM BPCON BS EXEC NEXEC EPS 
BCOM  1.000000 -0.167424 -0.122409 -0.688622  0.504625  0.141811 
BPCON -0.167424  1.000000  0.346826  0.365983  0.162801  0.126839 
BS -0.122409  0.346826  1.000000  0.764287  0.761717 -0.066799 
EXEC -0.688622  0.365983  0.764287  1.000000  0.164349 -0.118048 
NEXEC  0.504625  0.162801  0.761717  0.164349  1.000000  0.016427 
EPS  0.141811  0.126839 -0.066799 -0.118048  0.016427  1.000000 
 
 BCOM BPCON BS EXEC NEXEC EPS 
 Mean  0.607529  0.700000  11.43333  4.566667  6.866667  32.04333 
 Median  0.600000  1.000000  11.00000  4.000000  7.000000  10.00000 
 Maximum  0.909091  1.000000  20.00000  11.00000  11.00000  918.0000 
 Minimum  0.200000  0.000000  5.000000  1.000000  1.000000 -1036.000 
 Std. Dev.  0.166475  0.466092  4.031628  2.648140  2.635740  281.9513 
Skewness -0.150824 -0.872872  0.204333  0.649336 -0.071525 -0.581501 
 Kurtosis  2.862496  1.761905  2.197493  2.793244  2.415876  11.28753 
       
Jarque-Bera  0.137373  5.725624  1.013781  2.161619  0.452080  87.54469 
 Probability  0.933619  0.057108  0.602366  0.339321  0.797686  0.000000 
       
 Observations 30 30 30 30 30 30 
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Dependent Variable: EPS 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/08/11   Time: 08:48 
Sample: 1 30 
Included observations: 30 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -123.2906 276.4233 -0.446021 0.6593 
BCOM 271.3018 328.3320 0.826303 0.4162 
BPCON 116.9167 124.0918 0.942179 0.3548 
BS -7.988181 14.25078 -0.560543 0.5799 
R-squared 0.154861     Mean dependent var 32.04333 
Adjusted R-squared 0.114193     S.D. dependent var 281.9513 
S.E. of regression 289.4905 Akaike info criterion 14.29769 
Sum squared resid 2178923.     Schwarz criterion 14.48451 
Log likelihood -210.4653     F-statistic 0.503061 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.145904 Prob(F-statistic) 0.683508 
 
Dependent Variable: EPS 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/08/11   Time: 01:13 
Sample(adjusted): 2 30 
Included observations: 29 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -67.64559 294.6146 -0.229607 0.8203 
BCOM 264.9837 335.5354 0.789734 0.4374 
BPCON 118.3992 132.5929 0.892953 0.3807 
BS -12.40957 15.94769 -0.778142 0.4441 
AR(1) -0.109115 0.218943 -0.498372 0.6228 
R-squared 0.263836     Mean dependent var 32.70310 
Adjusted R-squared 0.242191     S.D. dependent var 286.9184 
S.E. of regression 299.8525     Akaike info criterion 14.40004 
Sum squared resid 2157877.     Schwarz criterion 14.63578 
Log likelihood -203.8006     F-statistic 0.409136 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.016085     Prob(F-statistic) 0.800241 
Inverted AR Roots       -.11 
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FIRMS BS EXEC NEXEC EPS BPC 
Japaul oil & Maritime Service Plc 7 4 3 12.91 1 
First Bank 15 8 7 4.44 1 
HIS Nigeria Plc 5 4 1 0.14 0 
PharmaDekoPlc 10 4 6 10 0 
Golden Penny Plc 13 2 11 145 1 
Dangote Flour Mills Plc 10 3 7 107 1 
Diamond bank Plc 14 9 5 48 1 
EcobankPlc 15 9 6 -0.64 1 
FCMB Plc 13 5 8 4 1 
Wema Bank Plc 7 3 4 -116 0 
UBA 20 9 11 60 1 
Union Bank Plc 14 5 9 -21.18 1 
Intercontinental Bank Plc 16 5 11 -1036 0 
Skye bank Plc 18 7 11 0.76 1 
Unity Bank PLc 15 6 9 -0.99 1 
Stanbic IBTC 18 11 7 33 1 
Guarrantee Trust Bank Plc 14 6 8 128 1 
TCN 11 1 10 10 1 
Unilever Plc 11 5 6 10 1 
UAC 10 4 6 148 1 
FIDSON 8 4 4 10 1 
MAY & BAYER 6 3 3 10 1 
EVANSMEDICAL 11 4 7 -1.14 0 
BigTreat 9 2 7 10 0 
GUINNESS 14 4 10 918 0 
Cadbury 7 2 5 -69 1 
NIWIL 5 1 4 10 0 
UTC 7 1 6 10 0 
NBC 9 1 8 566 1 
NEIMETH 11 5 6 -49 1 
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